 |
How to study History well? | home
Why did Italy not be unified before 1848?
Why was Italy not unified in the period 1789-1848?
By Mark Seaborn(1998)
The Kingdom of Italy was founded in 1861, uniting the Italian nation as one state under the King of Piedmont, Victor Emmanuel II. However, previously, in the period 1789-1848, although there had been some wishes for Italian unification, Italy had not been unified then. The main reason for this was that foreign opposition to Italian unification was strong, whereas Italian support for unification was much weaker and not always in agreement.
Foreign opposition to Italian unification came mainly from Austria in the periods 1789-96 and 1815-48. Prior to 1796, Italy had been divided into many states for historical reasons. Spain controlled much of Southern Italy, while the Papacy had always had control over its own land. Various states were centred around cities which had been the basis of wealth since the 15th century. This all changed in 1796 when Napoleon began to invade Italy, who by 1799 controlled all of it but Venetia. Napoleon divided Italy into three; the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Naples, both of which were under heavy French influence, and the rest which was absorbed into the French empire. Representative government was introduced along French lines (with a resulting shift of power from the upper classes to the middle classes), and Italian law standardised by the French legal codes; in comparison, the old states had been conservative autocracies.
In one respect Napoleon's invasions were an important step forwards for Italian unification, because they reduced the number of individual states. Napoleonic rule encouraged the growth of the middle classes and liberalism, both linked to unification. However, Italy was still heavily influenced by foreigners, and not unified, because Napoleon wanted to control Italy as part of his empire. This created nationalism, both anti-France and pro-Italy, the latter of which was to continue after 1815.
1815 brought the Battle of Waterloo, the fall of Napoleon, and the Congress of Vienna. The Congress of Vienna, representing the conservative forces of Europe, restored Italy to its pre-Napoleonic state in order to make French invasion harder and to restrain Italy's liberalist and nationalist movements. Austria was given direct control over Lombardy and Venetia, while the rulers of Modena, Parma and Tuscany were all related to the Austrian Hapsburgs. The Papal States were restored under the Pope's control, who was despotic and relied on Austrian force to keep control. The Kingdom of Naples (which included Sicily) was returned to the rule of a Spanish Bourbon, Ferdinand I, who made an agreement with Austria not to change Naples' system of government without their consent. So, Austria had considerable control over Italy. The only truly Italian state was Piedmont (also called the Kingdom of Sardinia), ruled by King Victor Emmanuel I of the Italian House of Savoy.
Many of these restored governments tried to suppress the Italian unification movement. Ferdinand I ruled Naples and Sicily autocratically, suppressing freedom of speech. In the Papal States, the clergy used the Inquisition and torture to suppress nationalism and liberalism. Austrian-controlled Lombardy and Venetia had strict police forces with organised spying and censorship to suppress free speech.
different parts of Italy. In 1820 a revolution in Spain sparked off a revolt in Naples. Ferdinand I agreed to grant a new constitution, but Metternich, worried about the success of the revolt, intervened, invading to regain control. Another revolt took place in 1831 in Modena as a result of a failed plan of Enrico Misley, who wanted a united Italy and a constitution. These revolts were put down by local troops. Also in 1831 was a revolt in the Papal States by the professional middle classes opposing clerical rule, which was repressed by papal troops. The revolts in this period had all failed, showing that the conservative forces were strong.
While there were many external forces acting against Italian unification, there were many internal obstacles to unification as well. For a start, Italy was not one single nation. Different dialects of Italian were spoken in different parts of Italy. There were huge economic differences between the South, which was poor, illiterate and mostly rural, and the North, which was more prosperous and contained more cities. Loyalties often lay locally, and the majority of peasants did not feel a sense of national identity.
The peasants that made up the majority of the population were generally not interested in unification. This is not surprising, since unification would not have had any tangible benefits for them. They were more interested in their immediate economic conditions; whether they had enough food. The peasants could only be used to help bring about unification when they rioted due to economic depressions and food shortages. The main supporters of Italian unification were, instead, the middle and upper classes.
However, among the supporters of unification, there was little agreement as to how unification should be achieved. Some were republicans who wanted Italy unified as one republic; and monarchists wanted Italy unified under an Italian king, such as Charles Albert of Sardinia. Others wanted an Italian confederation under the Pope. Some wanted the individual states to have new constitutions before they were unified; others wanted unification to happen in one step. There were also various different groups supporting unification, such as the Carbonari and Young Italy, although none had particularly widespread support. These groups failed to co-operate during the 1848 revolts, meaning that the undirected revolts were given little more direction. And importantly, there was no single leader for the unification movement. Although there were people such as Mazzini, he did not manage to unify the supporters of unification.
Many Catholics faced a dilemma as to who they would support. When one of the Pope's military commanders disobeyed orders to join Charles Albert, the Pope issued the Allocution, denouncing Piedmont's war with Austria, despite Pope Pius IX being more liberal than the previous Pope. Since many nationalists in Italy were also Catholics, they were unsure of whether to support the Pope's position or not; although many ignored the Pope.
Furthermore, in the Kingdom of Naples there was a separatist movement that wanted Sicily to separate from Naples. This resulted at one point in a revolt in Sicily in 1820. Later, in 1848, a successful Sicilian revolt took place, and a provisional Sicilian government was set up. This shows that Italy was far from united on the subject of unification.
Government in the Austrian-ruled states was also not entirely bad. While there was limited freedom of speech and taxes were high, the government was efficient, and governed much better than either the Pope or King Ferdinand, with nearly every town having an elementary school and most having secondary schools. This meant that often it was only the nationalists who had cause to complain.
There were a number of revolts in this period that could have been used as starting point to unify Italy. One of the first came in 1820, when a revolution in Spain sparked off a revolt in Naples, in which the Carbonari (the nationalist society) took part. Ferdinand I agreed to grant a new constitution, but made an agreement with Metternich, who was worried about the success of the revolt and intervened, invading to regain control.
Another revolt took place in 1831 in Modena as a result of a failed plan of Enrico Misley, who wanted a united Italy and a constitution, but whose plan had been betrayed by Duke Francesco IV. These revolts were put down by local troops, and failed. Also in 1831 was a revolt in the Papal States by the professional middle classes opposing clerical rule. This was repressed by papal troops.
In 1848, a revolt took place in Naples which was initially successful, with Ferdinand II making some liberal concessions. However, when peasants continued to revolt for land redistribution, this was used an excuse to appoint a conservative government, and the revolt suppressed. The failure of all of these revolts showed that the conservative forces were strong. In particular, Austria had an army: the unification movement did not. It would later be the actions of Cavour, who could mobilize an army, that would help further unification.
Unification of Italy as one single state in the period 1789-1848 failed for two main reasons: foreign opposition to unification was strong, where as support in Italy was weak. Not all Italians wanted Italy unified, and those that did were not in agreement about how to do it. There were practical barriers such as language and economic differences. Countries opposing, such as Austria, had strong armies, and could put down the revolts, which were undirected and unco-ordinated, and which could not be backed up by an army in favour of unification.
``Cavour went further than he intended towards the creation of a united Italy.'' Do you accept this view?
Mark Seaborn(10th May 1998)
In 1852, Cavour became Prime Minister of Piedmont, a northern Italian state with Victor Emmanuel II as constitutional monarch. In 1859, following a peace conference, Piedmont gained Lombardy, Tuscany and Emilia, the latter two confirmed by plebiscites. In 1860, Garibaldi invaded Sicily and Naples; Piedmont then invaded the Papal States (excluding Rome). All three were annexed to Piedmont, again confirmed by plebiscite. Cavour died in 1861, but unification of Italy was completed between 1862-71 through Garibaldi's annexation of Rome and Venetia.
Cavour played a prominent role in these events, but how much of it did he intend? Was he expecting Italy to be unified, and did he even try to prevent it?
Many nineteenth century historians subscribed to the view that Cavour did want a united Italy, and he achieved it through diplomatic skill and a ``master plan''. When it came to Garibaldi's invasion of the South, Cavour had been forced to condemn Garibaldi in public, so as not to lose respectability in the eyes of the other European powers, but helped him in private. King Victor Emmanuel concurred with Cavour, and supported his actions.
This view has been disputed by more recent historians. The ``new theory'' says that Cavour wanted a strong Piedmont under a constitutional monarch, rather than a united Italy: Cavour was neither a reactionary monarchist nor a republican revolutionary, he was a moderate. And as such, while he used diplomatic skill to gain some of the northern Italian states, he was not interested in the South, since gaining Naples and Sicily would provoke foreign opposition and be impractical. For this reason he not only condemned Garibaldi in public but tried desperately to stop him in private. However, while the ``old theory'' has Cavour and Victor Emmanuel as in agreement, the new theory says that Victor Emmanuel kept friendly with Garibaldi to use him against Cavour, so that Piedmont could still gain South Italy.
There are a number of pieces of evidence we can use to test these hypotheses. Firstly, we can ask the question, did Cavour try to stop Garibaldi in his invasions of Sicily and Naples?
On 24th April 1860, Cabinet Minutes (signed by Cavour) record that ``It was unanimously decided to refuse Garibaldi the guns he requires for the Sicilian insurrection, lest the European capitals should thereby be alarmed...''. Cavour did at least not want to help Garibaldi, and Cabinet records are unlikely to be unreliable.
In a letter on 12th May 1860, Cavour wrote: ``I regret Garibaldi's expedition as much as anyone...And the Ministry is in no position to face the immense unpopularity which would have been drawn upon it had Garibaldi been prevented...At the same time I omitted nothing to persuade Garibaldi to stop his mad scheme.'' This supports the new theory in that Cavour did not support Garibaldi, although he may not have opposed him by force. Since the letter was to Costantino Nigra, Cavour's personal assistant and secretary, it is unlikely that it was intended to mislead.
On 11th May 1860, a telegram from the Minister of the Interior informed that ``Piedmontese Warships have been ordered to stop Garibaldi if he is in Tuscan or Roman waters''. And on 12th May, a further telegram said that Garibaldi was to be arrested anywhere outside Sicilian orders at all costs. It is possible that the restrictions on these orders were to allow Garibaldi to succeed while looking as if Piedmont had tried to stop him, but unlikely since the telegrams were in cipher, and the words ``at all costs'' underlined.
On 14th July 1860 (at which point Garibaldi was readying to invade Naples), Cavour wrote to the Admiral of the Fleet, Persano, to say: ``We must at all costs on the one hand prevent Garibaldi from crossing the straits, and on the other excite a revolution in Naples. If this were to succeed, the government of Victor Emmanuel would at once be proclaimed there.'' This shows that Cavour does not want to be associated with a revolutionary army, but would rather Naples was gained of its own action, by revolution. Again, there is no reason why such a letter would mislead.
The old theory assumes that Victor Emmanuel and Cavour worked together harmoniously. This means that just showing that they did not agree is enough to disprove the old theory, at least partly.
Victor Emmanuel had told the British envoy George Cadogan, shortly after Cavour's resignation following the Armistice of Villafranca, ``Cavour is a muddle head who is always pushing me into some wasp's nest or other. Cavour is mad. I have often told him he was off his head.'' Cavour was equally clear when he said in a letter to Farini on 9th November 1860, ``The King does not like me and is often jealous...as a man I only want one favour from him, to keep as far away as possible.''
On 22nd July 1860, two notes were given by Victor Emmanuel to Count Litta to deliver to Garibaldi. The first instructed Garibaldi not to cross the straits to invade Naples. The second, however, told Garibaldi to ``Reply that you are full of devotion and reverence for your King, that you would like to obey his counsels, but that your duty to Italy forbids you to promise not to help the Neapolitans...''. Garibaldi's reply followed the King's instructions, and was published immediately by Cavour, so as to distance the actions from Piedmont. It also shows that Victory Emmanuel was keeping Garibaldi as an ally.
Furthermore, on 5th August 1860, Victor Emmanuel dictated: ``...to be conveyed to Garibaldi. Garibaldi in Naples. Will regulate himself according to opportunity...As soon as Garibaldi is in Naples he will proclaim its union to the rest of Italy as in Sicily. Prevent disorders which will harm our cause.'' Victor Emmanuel was in communication with Garibaldi, and, unlike Cavour, wished him to succeed.
This evidence shows that Cavour was opposed to Garibaldi's plans throughout. However, Cavour's plans on what to do changed. Initially, he did not want to force Garibaldi to stop for fear of unpopularity, but later sent his fleet to try to prevent the planned invasions. He also appears to have changed his mind from not wanting the South at all, for fear of opposition, to being willing to annex the South, but not by Garibaldi's actions. Either way, Cavour was not in control of events at the time. In contrast, Victor Emmanuel was undermining Cavour and supporting Garibaldi.
If Cavour was not in control during Garibaldi's invasions in 1860, was the first stage of unification, before 1860, unintentional as well? It is likely that Cavour's aims included gaining some of the northern Italian states, but not the South.
On 25th November 1858, Cavour wrote to his ambassador in Paris, ``If anyone talks to you seriously or jokingly about the reconstitution of Italy you must be bold and maintain that this can be solidly established only if Piedmont rests her head on the Alps and her feet on Ancona.'' Later, Massari recorded in his diary, for 29th December 1859, Cavour saying: ``We must leave Naples out of it. United Italy will be our children's achievement. I'm satisfied with what we've got, so long as we can reach Ancona.''
The old theory claims that Cavour had a master plan for uniting Italy. However, in gaining the northern states in 1859, Cavour owed much to a lucky diplomatic position. He was lucky that Napoleon III was in power in France at that time and wanted to reduce Austrian power in Italy. He was lucky that the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia and Russia had ended: Austria had threatened to join in with France and Britain against Russia in the Crimean war. In infuriation, Alexander II made a secret alliance with Napoleon III, promising Russian neutrality in an Italian war, and also put pressure on Prussia to not help Austria. Cavour was also lucky that Britain, at the time, believed a strong Italy was needed to counter Napoleon III's ambitions.
When Cavour met with Napoleon III, following Piedmont's part in the Crimean war, to make the Plombieres agreement, it is unlikely that Cavour had any fixed aims. As C. B. Seaman says, ``Cavour wanted to get as much as could reasonably be obtained, but no more''. Cavour's skill was in the way he continuously adapted his policies to fit the circumstances, and to fit what he saw as reasonably obtainable. He seems to have envisaged acquiring Tuscany and Romagna, and the agreement involved France driving the Austrians out of Lombardy-Venetia in return for Savoy and Nice. In this respect, Cavour did get out of his agreement with France what he intended, which was Lombardy, Tuscany and Emilia, and which was also what was ``reasonably obtainable'', since it was acceptable to the powers present at the peace conference.
Overall though, Cavour did go further than he intended towards the creation of a united Italy. While he did get what he intended prior to 1860 - an expansion of territory that was also acceptable to other powers - gaining the South was not part of his plans, which was impractical and the domain of revolutionaries. He opposed Garibaldi's invasions of Naples and Sicily, whilst Victor Emmanuel supported them, but failed to prevent them. As gaining the South became more likely, Cavour would have preferred it to happen via revolutions, but that failed as well. Cavour survived this by seamlessly annexing Naples and Sicily anyway. But since Cavour was not a nationalist, it cannot really be said that he intended a united Italy at all, rather that he went further than he expected or intended in the expansion of Piedmont.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------