Appeasement

How to study History well? | home

Appeasement

Justifications for Appeasement

Another war would be even more destructive than the 1914-18 conflict

Hitler presented a logical, convincing case in favour of revision; but he also seemed a dangerous fanatic who would risk major war if his grievances were not satisfied

Britain was too weak economically to fight another war

Nazi Germany was a useful barrier against the spread of Soviet Communism

Britain's defences meant that she was ill-prepared for war

Avoiding war would help the National Government to win the general election due by 1940

A war would leave the vast and sprawling British Empire vulnerable to attack

Britain had too few allies: neither the French, the Americans, nor the Russians could be relied on

Appeasement bought time to rearm

Versailles was based on false notions of German war guilt

Britain had too many potential enemies and certainly could not afford to get involved in a war against Germany, Italy and Japan

Public opinion seemed set against war

Events in central and eastern Europe were of no direct concern to Britain.

The rationale for appeasement

Once you are aware of what happened, you should list possible reasons why Britain's politicians tried to satisfy Hitler's grievances and thereby avoid war. Your list will probably include those in the panel below.

But do not be satisfied with drawing up a list like this. Rearrange your points so that they are in coherent order. (How would you rearrange the list below, so that groups of related causes appear together?) You should also attempt to rank them into some sort of order of importance. Next, you should add evidence, in order to substantiate them. This of course is absolutely vital, since a generalisation without evidence is merely an assertion. Try to compile enough evidence so that you can be confident of tackling any question that comes up, and try to pick the best evidence, which often means finding short, easily memorable quotations from contemporaries. For instance, quote Baldwin's assertion that 'the bomber will always get through' to show the fear of another war. Or, to show defence weakness, quote General Ironside at the time of Munich insisting that 'Chamberlain is of course right. We have not the means of defending ourselves and he knows it....We cannot expose ourselves now to a German attack. We simply commit suicide if we do.' (Or, to get the highest grade, try to find evidence which is not quoted so often in the textbooks, in order to avoid boring the examiner with over-familiar material. Sometimes students assume that examiners are always fair, impartial and wide awake. Would that it were so!)

Finally, try to judge when each of your points was most relevant. Guilt feelings about Versailles, for instance, may have been important in 1933-36 but they were far less important in the years that followed. Similarly there is far more evidence that the politicians followed public opinion when the passive Baldwin was premier than in the period after May 1937, when Chamberlain followed a more active brand of appeasement. You must be sure to avoid giving the impression that the 1930s were a static period.

The case for the prosecution

It is easy to draw up reasons explaining appeasement - and even easier to fall into the trap of supposing that, because a policy can be explained, it was therefore a sensible policy to pursue, and perhaps the best policy to pursue. Hence it is vital to consider the case against appeasement, and especially against Chamberlain's appeasement.

What points will you make? Perhaps you might focus on Chamberlain's relative ignorance of foreign affairs: he once insisted that it was right that the Sudetenland should be 'returned' to Germany, whereas in fact it had never been part of the German state. Did he, as his critics asserted, see foreign affairs 'through the wrong end of a municipal drain-pipe'? Furthermore, did he ever really understand Hitler? Appeasement was based on the assumption that, at some point, Hitler would be satisfied with concessions; but every time Chamberlain was reasonable, Hitler's contempt for the man grew. 'Our opponents', he said, 'are little worms: I saw them at Munich.' The guarantee to Poland at the end of March 1939 owed more to Halifax's initiative than to Chamberlain's, and the Premier continued to put pressure on Poland to make concessions over Danzig. Moreover Chamberlain made only half-hearted attempts to secure an alliance with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939. He sent a relatively low-level delegation to Moscow, headed by Admiral Drax - and they travelled not by air by a slow boat. Nor did Chamberlain hasten to make good the guarantee when Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September. Was Chamberlain therefore an unconscious pacifist who, at heart, wanted peace at any price?

Churchill said, after the Munich crisis, that Chamberlain had been given a choice between 'dishonour and war: you chose dishonour, but you will still have war'. This view was vindicated by events. Hence it is tempting to agree with Churchill's critique and to believe that a policy of resistance would have yielded better results.

Books on Appeasement

Philip Bell, 'Appeasement', in Martin Pugh (ed), A Companion to Modern European History 1871-1945 (1997)

John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (1989)

Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press (1989)

Alan Farmer, Britain: Foreign and Imperial Affairs 1919-39 (1992)

Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy (1981)

R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement (1993)

Keith Robbins, Appeasement (1988)

William Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s (1977)

The critics criticised

On the other hand, Churchill - an unrepentant imperialist - had a romantic, unrealistic view of Britain's position in world affairs (and of his glorious destiny in our unfolding history). Chamberlain considered, with good reasons, that an all-out programme of rearmament would severely weaken the whole economy, putting Britain at a severe disadvantage if a long war were to be fought. Nor was Churchill, in the 1930s, as implacably opposed to appeasement as he later claimed. Indeed he was quite prepared to turn a blind eye to Japanese and Italian aggression, and his opposition to German appeasement was not as sharp or prolonged as he later indicated. In 1948, in The Gathering Storm, he decided that the Second World War could easily have been avoided but for the foolish policy of appeasement. But at other times in his career he viewed attempts to avoid war differently. In The World Crisis (1923) he decided that 'a war postponed may be a war averted'; and in a speech in Washington in June 1954 he insisted that to 'jaw-jaw is better than to war-war'.

Make your mind up time

Was Chamberlain right? He said that he 'was hoping for the best [by appeasing Hitler] while preparing for the worst [by rearming]'. Did this make sense? Aware that declaring war on behalf of Czechoslovakia would have been an empty gesture, given Britain's inability to help the Czechs, he chose to appease Hitler while there still seemed to be a chance of avoiding a catastrophic war. By waiting until September 1939 he was able to enter the conflict with a united nation behind him, with the support of the Dominions, and with the moral support of neutral nations like the USA. A good case can be made out for Chamberlain. And if he was motivated by an unconscious pacifism, it can still be argued that he did the right thing, even if for the wrong reason. Some would say that his policy went awry only with the guarantee to Poland. A fashionable argument nowadays is that Chamberlain should have persisted with his appeasement, and thereby kept Britain out of the Second World War.

What verdict will you reach on the anti-appeasement argument? Were Britons led astray into pursuing an unwise policy by their insularity, by their guilt feelings over Versailles and by fear of Armageddon? Would another, firmer stance have fared better, perhaps fuelling anti-Nazi critics in Germany and even leading to Hitler's downfall? Some have said that Churchill was motivated by implacable anti-German feelings. If so, perhaps it was he who did the right thing for the wrong reason.

Reaching a final verdict is anything but easy. Try rehearsing the various arguments in your mind to see which ones makes most sense. Better still, try debating them with other people. Put yourself in the position of someone in the 1930s - and remember not to use hindsight. Events which, to us, are in the past were in the future - and therefore unknowable - in the 1930s. To get best results, you will need to make a real imaginative effort. It is no good simply dodging inconvenient facts and evidence. Pretend that this is not merely an intellectual exercise. Pretend that you care and that the issue is vital - and, in the end, you probably will care. Then you will be in a position to argue a case convincingly.

Now you should return to your initial definition of appeasement, expanding it and giving your final views. By this stage you should have the satisfaction of knowing your own mind and of having squarely confronted the difficulties of this fiendishly complex but endlessly intriguing topic.

Appeasement is one of the most controversial and hotly contested issues in modern history. The arguments for and against are so finely balanced that it is immensely difficult for hard-pressed students - and academics - to make up their minds. No longer can we accept the simplistic theory that portrayed the appeasers, and especially Neville Chamberlain, as cowardly, short-sighted and wishful-thinking Guilty Men who encouraged Hitler's territorial appetites and whose almost criminal negligence left Britain undefended. Nor can the anti-appeasers, pre-eminently Winston Churchill, any longer be assigned the role of valiant heroes, struggling manfully to avoid 'the unnecessary war'. Instead, we have the unpleasant task of thinking for ourselves. How should we approach the topic?

The preliminary spade-work

The obvious starting point is a knowledge of events. Hence you must be familiar with European history from 1918 onwards. Try drawing up a table of relevant facts. From early in the period, you will no doubt include those provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which aggrieved the Germans. You should also be familiar with changing interpretations of the causes of the Great War. Initial notions of German war guilt, enshrined in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, gave way by the early-1930s to the view that no one country had been responsible and that, in Lloyd George's phrase, 'the nations slithered over the brink into the seething cauldron of war'. Do not forget, either, the stories of the atrocities committed by retreating German troops in 1918 which were later revealed as gross distortions and which, in consequence, led many to doubt the veracity of Nazi atrocities. But, of course, the bulk of your attention should go to the period when Hitler was in power. How far, by 1933, had Versailles been peacefully revised?

In addition, you must know (which means not having to struggle to recall) a chronology of his actions and of the responses of the appeasers. Appeasement only has meaning in relation to Hitler's rearmament and to his territorial demands and acquisitions.

Next, try formulating a working definition of appeasement. Do not give a value-laden definition. At this stage you should avoid deciding whether appeasement was, essentially, 'a good thing' or 'a bad thing'. Later you can return to this issue and formulate a final judgement.